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This paper examines Marcuse's approach to the major problem of
capitalism-the domination of subjective reason over objective
reason. It is argued that Marcuse's approach to this problem differs
from the approach of Critical Theory. It is further argued that
there is a contradiction in Marcuse~ argument, namely, the
contradiction between revolutionary change and the change
suggested by Marcuse's aesthetic perspective.
Herbert Marcuse , along with other critical theorists, -has
found the major problem of capitalism, especially in its modern
stage, manifested in the way that instrumental rationality has been
employed. For him, the present stage of history can be singled out
as a period in which the process of rationalization has become
entirely one-sided and limited only to the rationality of methods
and means. The reason for such one-sidedness and limitation,
according to Marcuse and the Critical School, can be found in the
domination of "subjective reason" over "objective reason" .
Rationality, which in its totality aims at the emancipation of man,
has turned out to be the main source of alienation and
self-imprisonment for mankind. The manifestation of one-sided
rationality (instrumental rationality) and alienated man. can be
seen in the dialectical relationships among man, society, and
nature.
In order to explain the dialectical relationships among man,
society, and nature in the contemporary system of domination,
Marcuse argues that a new approach to social phenomenon must
be adopted because the traditional perspectives, including the
instrumental perspective, have not been able to predict the
developments of the present stage of history. According to
Marcuse, a new perspective is needed to understand and guide the
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revolutionary change which must occur within the present system
of domination and the relationship of man to nature. The new
perspective suggested by Marcuse is. the ae~th~tic perspec~ive,
which emancipates man by translatmg subjective reason I~to
objective form. Marcuse's aesthetic perspective does not reJe~t
instrumental rationality, but rather complements and enh.an~es ~t.
It is the purpose of this paper to explore a contradiction m
Marcuse's argument, namely, the contradiction betwee~
revolutionary change and the change suggested b.y Marcuse,s
aesthetic perspective. I will not attempt to pOSIt Marcuse s
approach wrong. Rather, I will only show. a discr~panc! b~tween
critical theory and Marcuse's perspectIve. ThIS will involve
examining: 1) the problem of the domination of subjective reaso~
over objective reason; 2) Critical Theory's approach to this
problem; and 3) Marcuse's approach to this problem an~ .the
discrepancy between Marcuse's approach and that of Critical
Theory.
THE DOMINATION OF SUBJECTIVE
REASON OVER OBJECTIVE REASON
For Marcuse and other critical theorists "reason was born
from man's urge to dominate nature...." (Horkheimer,
1974: 176). This urge has faced a contradiction from the
beginning which Horkheimer has called the "disease of reason."
Despite such a disease, reason has expanded constantly, to ~he
extent that it has touched almost all aspects of human life.
Moreover; reasen has become the "fundamental category of
philosophical thought" . (Marcuse, 1968: 135), which aims to
. understand the essence of being. Of course, in order to understand
the true essence of being, the situation, the historical context,
customs, laws and existing regularities must also be taken into
account. .
Reason also is the ultimate base of social action or, in the
Weberian sense, meaningful action. Meaningful action can be
achieved by. applying "the faculty of classification, inference, and
deduction, no matter what the specific content-the abstract
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functioning of the thinking mechanism. This type of reason may
be calle~ 'subjective reason' " (Horkheimer, 1974: 3). Subjective
reason IS the base of instrumental rationality which is "a
method-mean rationality for achieving ends, but it is not
responsible for rationality of these ends themselves" (Landmann,
1976: 187).
In contrast, there exists another type of reason, which not
only seeks to apply rational means to achieve ends, but also is
emphatically responsible for the quality of ends themselves. This
type of reason can be named "objective reason."
Great philosophical systems, such as those of Plato and Aristotle,
Scholasticism, and German idealism were founded on an objective
theory of reason. It is aimed at evolving a comprehensive system, or
hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims. The degree of
reasonableness of man's life could be determined according to its
hannony with this totality. Its objective structure, and not just
man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual
thoughts and actions (Horkheimer, 1974: 4).
Man works upon nature as his "inorganic body" and through
his works he should be able to realize and experience his full
capacities. But self-realization and experience of man's hidden
capacities through encounter with nature are only possible if a
synthesis between 'the objective and subjective reason is
~complished. During the past and under the present
CIrcumstances, "objective reason" has become more and more
alien.ated from "subjective reason", and the latter has entirely, ,
dominated the former. The immediate consequence of such a
situa.tion .is t~e impossibility of self-realization through man's
relaticnship WIth nature. Moreover, the domination over nature
has lost its meaning and aim (the emancipation of man) and has
become an end in itself. Man no more seeks his alienated
potentialities through work upon nature and mastery over it;
rather, his attempts are in search of mastery itself. The outcome of
this situation, as Max Horkheimer has seen it, is frustration and
self-estrangement which man' has faced from the time he began to
overcome nature.
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The disease of reason is that reason was born from man's urge to
dominate nature.... From the time when reason became the
instrument for domination of human and extra-human nature by
man-that is to say, from its very beginning-it has been frustrated
in its own intention of discovering the truth. This is due to the very
fact that it made nature a mere object, and that it failed to discover
the trace of itself in such objectification, in the concept of ~atter
and things not less than in those of gods and spirit (Horkheimer,
1974: 176).
The cause of reason's inability to trace itself through
objectification in the concept of matter and t,h~gs is based, upon
the contradiction inherent in the human condition and man surge
to dominate nature. Forms of thinking and their struc~ures have
always been conditioned by the social need of c~ntr~llmg nat~re
on the one hand, and the incompetence of society in re~ressIng
the idea of something transcending the subjectivity of self-mterest,
to which the self could not help aspiring, on the other hand
(Horkheirner, 1974). ... .
Under such a situation, the dommatlon of subjective reason
over objective reason becomes almos~ ~evitable. And when
subjective reason, alienated from the objective type, becomes the
dominant form of reason, the mastery of nature can only be
possible through instrumental rationality. This point turns to be a
central issue for Marcuse as well as other members of the
Frankfurt School. Accordingly, their focus of attention bec.omes a
critique of instrumental rationality, not onl~ for, presentmg the
. irrationality of ends based on instru~ent~rationality, but ,also for
introducing new perspectives whlc;h 31m at overcommg the
irrational ends.
CRITICAL THEORY AND THE
CONCEPT OF REASON
According to Critical Theory, a synthesis between obje~tive
reason and subjective reason should and can be attained.
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Accomplishment of such a synthesis will give reason a critical
characteristic which can be applied for criticizing the existing
reality for the sake of troth.
Criticism of existing reality is a central point for the Critical
School. Such a criticism should be based (as Marx has pointed out)
upon "the dialectical movement of reality and truth" (Lefebvre,
1969: 3). The truth for Marx, as well as the Critical School, is
inseparable from a given society's actual conduct of life. The
critique of present reality aims to show the possibilities of
overcoming and going beyond the present situation, the mere
process which is inherent in history. The critique of present
conditions will give way to the necessity of change. Such a
necessity will be a new reality which aims at negation of existing
reality. The present reality, in light of this critique, will lose its
grounds and will be proven as a false-reality. According to Critical
Theory, the method of overcoming and going beyond the
false-reality is a negative dialectic, which is the core of a critical
theory of society.
The. alienation of "subjective reason" from "objective
reason" and the domination of the former over the latter have
blocked the transcendental nature of history. The false reality has
been metamorphized by the system of domination as the ultimate
reality which remains unchanged. Reason is thus no longer a
means of criticizing domination and its legitimizing bases. It is
unable to go beyond the existing social constraints in order to
observe the present against a possible future.
. It should be noted that the ideas of truth and reality and the
dialectical --'movement between them constitute an unsolved
problem of Marxism and later of the Critical School. The attempts
of Marxists and critical theorists have not solved the problem
manifested in the quest for grounding truth and reality. The theory
of cognition as a reflection of social existence with its positivistic
orientation has failed to present an acceptable ground for reality
which man aims to achieve through his "constant and progressive
evolution. Man is involved in ... limitless striving for
perfection ... which intends to make it more similar to
reality ..." (Kolakowski, 1969: 39). . .
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MARCUSE'S AESTHETIC PERSPECTIVE
Despite the quest for grounding the idea of reality and its
transcendental nature, the present situation is, according to
Marcuse and other critical theorists, in need of revolutionary
change for a better reality in which the environment of freedom
will come to exist. For creating such an environment, Marcuse
suggests a complementation and enhancement of instrumental
rationality with the aesthetic perspective.
For Marcuse, the modern society, by means of technology
and science, has gained enormous rational capacities. But such
capacities have been negated by the intervention of irrational
political systems and therefore cannot contribute to the happiness
of mankind. Technology, which is able to emancipate man from
an irrational work system, has been used for creating false needs
and a great desire for fulfilling those needs. Hence, it has deepened
the irrationality of work systems which benefit the status quo.
Rationality is not an absolute, unchanging factor, but relative to
the respective historical movement. Historical development and
changing reality expose rationality to be still irrational: reason
becomes nonsense. Contemporary rationality is also disavowed by
the fact that it wants to perpetuate the status quo. It calls theories
that contradict the existing universe irrational, while they are the
rational ones precisely because they refuse to cooperate with
madness (Landmann, 1976: 195).
'Under present circumstances, reason is. not. "a- critical
tribunal" as it is supposed to be, and work is no longer a pathway
toward self-realization and emancipation. Reason through the
instrumental perspective has enabled the modern society to adopt
new styles of life which are based on a higher standard of living
and has created more comfort. But man has received this coupled
with the high cost of the enormous frustration and imprisonment
which has been portrayed in modem life. Consequently, a new
approach toward social phenomena should be developed in order
to explain the dialectical relationships between man, society, and
nature.
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The tradi~onal perspectives were not in a position to predict
~he .technolo?cal development of our time, the emergence of
~atlOnal political system.s, and t~e intervention of these systems
in ~he p.rocess of prcducuon and in t~e opera~~nof technological
rationalitv. The dom~atlo? of techmcal-admmlstrative systems as
a new source of alienanon cannot be explained merely b
movements of economic exchange. Therefore, a new perspectiv~
should be developed in response to the characteristics of
contemporary systems of domination. But what is to be done?
Marcuse argues that:
· · · strengthening any of the partial rationalities of the present
system can only contribute further to the irrationality of the
whole. It would be an intensification of repression and destruction,
which are the work of this false rationality. Therefore, mere
reforms, improvements in detail, are of no help, but, on the
contrary, serve the bad whole. What is necessary is a revolutionary
change of the system itself, a "reversal of the trend." But that
means a break with the prevalent technological rationality
(Landmann, 1976: 195).
In order to make the present situation rational Marcuse
de~~ly believes that a revolutionary change is nece;sary, and
C~tlCal Theory ~erves as a guideline for such a change. The central
pomt of revolutionary 'change is the relationship between man and
nature, a relationship which under the present circumstances is
destructive and a major source of frustration. In reference to the
ne~e~sity .of a revolutionary change within the system and the
relationship of man to nature, Marcuse has presented his aesthetic
perspective, which aims at the potential emancipation of man.
In Counterrevolution and Revolt, he has suggested that:
· · · if the instrumental perspective-nature as perceived according
to the form of technical control-is taken as the only guiding
principle of human action, its objective (the satisfaction of needs)
will inevitably be thwarted, owing to distortions in the formulation
of needs under these circumstances; the aesthetic perspective must
25
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complement and enhance, not seek to repeal, the instrumental ~ne
in order to realize the full potentialities of nature · · .(Leiss,
1975: 166).
He argues that the aesthetic perspective would be able to translate
"subjective sensibility into objective form" (Marcuse,.1969), ~nd
thus nature would not be approached as a mere object outside
man and ready for exploitation. .
. In short, Marcuse has indicated the n~cess~ty ?f a
revolutionary change which aims to transform the rrra:Ion:tllty of
modern time. He quests for a synthesis between subjective and
objective approaches toward nature which will create a. ~e~
possibility to communicate ~it~ nature. "The ~erm :aesth~t~c, ill
its dual connotation of 'pertaining to the senses and p~rtalnIng.to
art,' may serve to designate the quality of the productIve-creatIve
process in an environment of freedom" (Marc~se, 1969: 32).. .
Although Marcuse believes that a revolutionary change within
the system of instrumental rationality is necessary, he nevertheless
rejects the usefulness of any refor~ or eve~ detailed
improvements. Furthermore, in ~is ae.sthetlc perspectIve he does
not believe that instrumental rationality should be repealed, but
rather that it should be enhanced and complemented. This is
precisely, in my opinion, the contradiction referred to a~ove. For
a revolutionary change is a structural change, a destruction of the
present system. When a system faces a revolutionary change, there
is no guarantee that any part of the system will remain unchanged.
of course, this does not mean that everything will chan~e, b~t
rather .that. vee ",do. not know.which part will change .and which w~
not. Marcuse himself agrees with this point. In one of. hIS
interviews Revolution over "Reform, he correctly has emphasized
that histo~ is not an insurance corporatio~ to guarantee things.
This is precisely the contradiction ~ am referrIng.to .here.
Marcuse believes in the necessity of revolutionary change, but
at the same time he does not like to see the abolition of
technological progress which is based upon. instrumental
rationality. His aesthetic perspective does not aun. to r~place
instrumental rationality. It is only an approach which gives a
subjective meaning to nature and creates a rational end for
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instrumental rationality. From Marcuse's point of view, it is a
combination of the aesthetic and the instrumental perspectives
which will create a revolutionary change within the system.
But Marcusehas never indicated the conditions under which
the aesthetic perspective will become an acceptable attitude·
toward nature, or how this perspective', among allpossibilities, will
be chosen. Moreover, he has never explained the possible
confrontation between the existing system of domination and his
approach which aims at the negation of this system. Today we are
witnessing the establishment of many national and international
organizations which deal with different issues regarding the
protection of nature. Is this a process of institutionalizing an
aesthetic perspective?
In spite of these problems, one thing is very clear: Marcuse
does not reject the technological progresses of our time, nor does
he desire their abolition.
The progressive reduction of physical labor power in the
production process (the process of material production) and its
replacement to an increasing degree by mental labor concentrate
socially necessary labor in the class of technicians, scientitists,
engineers, etc .... This suggests possible liberation from alienated
labor (Marcuse, 1970: 66).
In the preceding passage, which sounds very Saint-Simonian,
Marcuse has recognized the potentialities of the present system for
change. But what has blocked the realization of these
potentialities is the intervention of irrational political systems in
the process of total rationality. Moreover, the aesthetic perspective
will never come to 'exist unless the immediate necessities of man
are ful:6lled. It is childish to believe that the workers, in spite of
the existence of an industrial reserve army, will go on strike
whenever their company wants to carry out a project which is
hostile to nature. For the same reason, it is also childish to believe
that a man who is hungry will not destroy nature because of his
sense ofbeauty .
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Mid-American Review of Sociology CULT AND SPORT: THE CASE OF BIG RED
The fulftllment of man's needs and the abolition of poverty
cannot be attained unless the present system of social hierarchy
undergoes thorough revolutionary changes. And i~ a revolution~ry
change comes to exist, no one will be able :0 predict the necessiry
of an aesthetic perspective after the revolution.
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